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The U.S. corporate governance system also has gone through major changes over the years. Prior to the 1980s, executives paid attention to shareholder interests but they defined those interests differently than today. Allocating corporate resources to retained earnings (for internal expansion) and to employee pension and health benefits were viewed as being good for shareholders in the long term, even though it might mean that less money flowed to shareholders in the short term. CEOs, unlike their contemporary counterparts, were more likely to have come up through the ranks and more likely to view the corporation as a community of stakeholders than as shareholder property.
The Way it Was
Writing in the early 1930s, economists Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means observed that large American corporations had ceased being controlled by their owners and that control had passed into the hands of a new class of professional managers. 3 The separation of ownership and control had taken decades to occur, as the fortunes of founding families were split up and as new shares found their ways into the hands of millions of individuals. Any one of these individuals did not own enough stock to sway management decisions, nor did they own enough to make it worth their time to try. This left executives with discretion to do what they thought was in the corporation's best interests.
For many large American companies in the early decades of the twentieth century, a crucial problem was the 'labor question': the threat of militant unionism and worker unrest. Employers also worried about taxation, in particular, that the United States might follow Europe in adopting expensive unemployment, old-age, and health insurance plans.
Gradually, employers crafted a solution. They stopped treating employees as commodities that could be hired and fired at will and began to seek worker loyalty through a bevy of programs known collectively as welfare capitalism. Welfare capitalism ranged from training schools and safety programs to recreational activities and company housing. New personnel departments took away the foreman's power to hire and fire and made employment more orderly and secure.
employee benefits, and an application of the Johnson & Johnson credo to corporate governance.
In 1956, a group of Harvard social scientists led by Francis X. Sutton published a classic study of postwar business ideology called The American Business Creed. 4 In it the authors observed that, "corporation managers generally claim that they have four broad responsibilities: to consumers, to employees, to stockholders, and to the general public….each group is on an equal footing; the function of management is to secure justice for all and unconditional maxima for none. Stockholders have no special priority;
they are entitled to a fair return on their investment, but profits above a "fair" level are an economic sin." This was a stakeholder philosophy of governance, in which shareholders were just one of several groups recognized by managers; it would be viewed as heretical by today's proponents of shareholder value.
According to the Harvard study, managers in the 1950s insisted on their right to make decisions independent of shareholder pressure, within "a sphere of unhampered discretion and authority which is not merely derivative from the property rights of owners." Managers also asserted their authority to plow surplus cash back into the enterprise rather than pay it to shareholders, a practice that they defended as "the way the American system works." Apportioning profits between dividends and retained earnings (and other spending purposes) was viewed as "one aspect of the general function of balancing competing economic interests which devolve on corporate management."
The new stakeholder philosophy had ideological purposes but it was more than mere words. The years from the 1950s through the 1970s were the highpoint of corporate social responsibility in the United States, as evidenced in the fact that by the 1970s, fortyeight states had passed laws permitting corporations to give funds to charities without specific charter provisions. Courts conceded that these social activities might hurt shareholders in the short run. But responding to the needs of various stakeholders was, in the words of legal scholar Margaret Blair, thought to be "good for the shareholders 'in the long run' because the health and well being of the communities in which companies operate was considered important for business." and some labor unions. Investors were unhappy with the economic situation and the way business was responding to it. They felt that company executives had grown too complacent and weren't doing enough to squeeze value out of corporate assets. Another investor complaint was that companies had spent too much money acquiring companies in unrelated industries where they had no particular competence, the most egregious example being conglomerates like ITT and Textron, which operated in dozens of sectors.
Investors argued that cash from mature businesses would be better spent on share repurchases or dividends, since investors could earn a higher return on those funds than the companies themselves.
Investors became more vocal in the 1970s because the structure of shareholding had changed since the time of Berle and Means's study. A growing number of shares now were concentrated in the hands of giant institutional investors: chiefly pension funds, but also mutual funds, trusts, and insurance companies. Whereas institutional investors held less than10 percent of shares in the early 1950s, by the early 1980s this had risen to almost 45 percent. Institutional investors were different from households in at least two ways. First, they owned or managed significant chunks of a corporation, not enough to give them outright control, although sometimes this could be achieved through alliances with other institutional investors. Second, because their holdings were so large, they were illiquid, meaning that institutional investors were likely to use "voice" --pressuring corporate executives --and not only "exit --selling their holdings --when dissatisfied with a company's performance.
by the fact that public spending on health, pensions, and unemployment insurance was relatively meager in the United States to begin with.
These changes were inconsistent with the old stakeholder-governance credo and required a new philosophy to justify them. Enter the shareholder value model, promulgated by Wall Street and its allied attorneys and economists. Now, what had previously been latent and fluid in corporate law was made rigidly manifest: corporations were the property of shareholders; boards and executives had the solitary charge of maximizing share prices. To insure that boards did their job, it was recommended that they be small and independent of the company's senior management. Management's job was to concentrate every day on boosting the company's share price. But to do this, executives needed incentives to make sure that they did the shareholders' bidding.
Executive compensation was completely changed, with pay now tied to stock performance through options and similar devices. The growth of options was phenomenal: fewer than a third of CEOs received them in 1980, whereas twenty years later almost all CEOs had them. Although options sometimes were paid to middle managers or even ordinary employees, the bulk went to a firm's top executives, for whom they eventually dwarfed base salary. When hiring CEOs, corporate boards increasingly rejected insiders in favor of tough outsiders who had no sentimental loyalty to the workforce. As competition for talent heated up, executive compensation rose ever higher and the average tenure of corporate leaders declined (to about three years, on average).
It may seem obvious --a tautology, really --that shareholder value is good for shareholders, if not for employees and the environment. But even for shareholders, problems arose in the way the shareholder-value model incentivized executives to produce value. Executives realized that they could get rich under the new system by pumping up share prices. But with only three years available, they had to act quickly.
These circumstances were ripe for abuse and in some cases they led to the corporate scandals we associate today with Enron.
One way to get rich quick was to manipulate stock option formulas. Many companies did so in ways that were inimical to shareholder interests, as when options rewarded executives for general market movements or when they were repriced after a slide in the company's stock. Another approach was to pursue quick, dramatic restructurings through acquisitions or downsizings, the kind of tactics pioneered by corporate raiders. Restructuring was accompanied by a lot of chest-thumping about getting lean and mean, rhetoric that gave a boost to share prices. But only now, years after it all started, are we discovering that restructuring often failed to produce lasting value. Take mergers and acquisitions. An analysis by Business Week showed that, while there were some successful M&As during the period 1995-2001, the majority resulted in a reduction in share prices several years after the acquisition. As for downsizing, a recent Russell Sage Foundation study finds that downsizing in the 1980s and 1990s did increase profits--and executive pay--but that it did not boost productivity, contrary to Wall Street's claims that it did.
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Sometimes it takes an insider to tell the truth, a CEO who knows other CEOs and has watched corporate America from up close. James Goodnight, the CEO of software manufacturer SAS, is one such person. SAS is a privately-held company; Goodnight personally owns about two-thirds of its stock. The company is famous for treating its employees lavishly--it has an on-site health center and flexible work schedules--which gives it one of the lowest employee turnover rates in the technology industry. When asked why his company paid such high benefits to its employees and refused to lay them off during slack periods, Goodnight said, "At many companies the focus is not on the employee or the customer but on the shareholder. The outlook is not for long-term growth but for the next quarter. In today's Wall Street-driven business environments, I
think it's difficult for many people to see how employee turnover or employee morale can impact a company's performance over a long period of time. . . . It all comes back to the fact that I don't need to justify SAS's benefits to thousands of shareholders. " Unfortunately, the message was wishful thinking. The causal links between governance, productivity, and growth are vague and unproven. Research by Dan Dalton and others shows that even the most basic elements of shareholder-value governance--independent boards, small boards of directors, use of stock options--are not statistically associated with better corporate performance. In the wake of Enron, this should come as little surprise. Moreover, if shareholder-value policies produce higher profits by redistributing resources rather than raising productivity, those profits--and share prices--will not keep growing in the future.
A great leap was involved in inferring that a nation's growth--or lack of it--has something to do with its dominant governance model. Japan and the United States cross-holdings, making more shares available for foreign purchase). Large companies put an outsider or two on their boards and beefed up their investor relations departments.
They also adopted more transparent accounting procedures. But in my interviews with senior executives in Japan, I found them doubtful that stakeholder governance was responsible for Japan's problems or that a shift to American practices would cure what ailed the Japanese economy. Instead executives placed the blame on other--more "macro"--factors such as botched fiscal policies, the Bank of Japan's monetary stringency, and a tortoise-like resolution of Japan's banking mess.
Until recently, these doubts were expressed quietly. Schwarzenegger has proposed terminating CalPERS in favor of a defined-contribution pension plan for state workers.) Yet the SEC proposal is a modest step in the right direction, one that would help to counteract conformity and cronyism on corporate boards.
By giving shareholders a real opportunity to be represented on boards, it would repair defects in the crude shareholder-value model. Combined with other recent changes--the de-emphasis of stock options and quarterly results, the explosive growth of socially responsible investing--it would push U.S. corporate governance towards a more balanced approach, one that recognizes that shareholders are not the only group with a
